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ABSTRACT
Our paper reports the following two findings:
1) In monthly data, bond purchases by the Fed raise bond prices and reduce bond yields.  The residual
bond-supply to traders is not fully predictable, and this supply-risk adds between 10 and 40 basis points
to the standard deviation of the real interest rate on T-bills.
2) The Fed's open market purchases do not raise stock prices or reduce stock returns.  If anything, they
raise stock returns.  More generally, bonds and stocks do not co-move at high frequencies.
To explain these two facts, we model the bond and stock markets as spatially separate or 'segmented'.
In the model, bond purchases lower bond rates, but they do not affect stock returns, and this is consistent
with both facts.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Monthly data show that surprise bond purchases by the Fed raise bond prices and
reduce bond yields. Surprisingly, such injections do not raise stock prices or reduce
stock returns. If anything, they raise stock returns. In other words, the two markets
show a lack of comovement at high frequencies. This goes against the common view
that liquidity is good for bonds and stocks alike ￿ it is commonly argued, for instance,
that a discount-rate cut raises both bond prices and stock prices. Barsky (1989)
had argued that the prices of stocks and bonds will move in opposite directions
if risk-aversion changes, and this may well explain some of the decade-to-decade
changes or even changes that occur at business-cycle frequencies (Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist, 1996, ￿g. 1), but it is less compelling an explanation for monthly data.
We quantify the liquidity eﬀect on interest rates caused by supply-risk in the bond
market. This risk adds somewhere between 10 and 40 basis points to the standard
deviation of the real rate of interest on T-bills. The risk may well increase unless the
Fed expands the set of assets that it uses to conduct open market operations.
To explain these ￿ndings, we present a model that has a liquidity eﬀect in the
bond market, but not in the stock market. We extend Lucas￿s (1990) shopper-trader
paradigm by having the trader ￿rst visit the stock market and then a separate bond-
market in which he is surprised by the injection of bonds. The bond injection has no
eﬀect on stock prices because it is ￿sterilized￿ by lump-sum taxes. Expected policy
actions have no eﬀect in the model, and this is consistent with the fact that the
long run relative decline in bond ￿nance does not seem to have raised interest-rate
volatility as some other models would have predicted. We do show, however, that the
Fed will ￿nd it harder and harder to keep bond-supply risk low because the gradual
∗The authors thank the NSF for ￿nancial help, Fernando Alvarez, Robert Lucas, and participants
at the NBER￿s 2001 Summer Institute for useful comments, and Timothy Daniels for assistance in
obtaining data. Special thanks go to David Marshall and Helen Koshy for many detailed comments
on earlier drafts.
1paying down of the federal debt has meant that it has become harder to expand T-bill
issues to accommodate unexpectedly large rollover demands from foreign sources.
T-bills vs. non-borrowed reserves Since the 1970s, the Phillips-curve relation
seems to have broken down, and money seems to have no clear eﬀect on real interest
rates either. Only if we assume that some part of money responds to real variables
can we conclude that the exogenous part of money does move interest rates. Evans
and Marshall (1998), for example, describe several scenarios￿identifying assumptions￿
under which some part of the money supply can plausibly be said to move real interest
rates. In other words, what we infer about a liquidity eﬀect on interest rates depends
on what we believe the Fed reacts to when it sets the money supply.
But, if we wish to estimate the liquidity eﬀect on interest rates, or even if we wish
to study the interest rate channel of monetary policy, is money the right measure of
policy? The rate of interest is the return on bonds, which depends most directly not
on the supply of money but on the supply of bonds. Using the quantity of bonds ,
one can ￿nd a liquidity eﬀect without introducing a host of other variables.
Whether we measure money by non-borrowed reserves or more broadly, injections
of money are not the same as withdrawals of, say, Treasury bills (T-bills). This is
because the Fed sometimes injects money by buying long-term bonds, and this will
aﬀect short-term rates less than would a purchase of T-bills. Indeed, table 1 shows
that, since 1961, the correlation between monthly growth in the real per capita supply
of outstanding Treasury securities (T-secs) and non-borrowed reserves (NBR), which
one might expect to be negative, has been slightly positive at .048.1 The table also
shows that, at least since 1980, growth in non-borrowed reserves has reduced short-
term rates, but not as strongly as a contraction of T-secs. Over the whole period,
however, growth in both non-borrowed reserves and T-secs is positively correlated
with short-term rates￿which, for non-borrowed reserves, is the wrong sign.




t−1,t ) .046 -.063
corr(rt,t+1,g
T−secs
t−1,t ) .137 .107
corr(NBR,T-secs) .048 -.007
1Tables 1 and 2 both deal with ex-post real returns of investors who purchase three-month U.S.
Treasury bills in the secondary market with two months remaining until maturity and sell them
a month later. In the tables, rt,t+1 is the return obtained from purchasing the T-bill in month t
and selling in month t +1 .T h e gNBR
t−1,t and gT−secs
t−1,t terms denote growth in the per capita real
supplies of non-borrowed reserves and marketable T-secs in the hands of the public (excluding the
Fed￿s holdings) over the previous month (i.e., from month t − 1 to month t). We obtain monthly
nonborrowed reserves from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and
describe other data sources in the text and in footnote 8.
2These conclusions do not change if we look instead at surprises, as in models
like Lucas (1990) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995). Table 2 presents the cor-
relations of interest rates with surprises in the growth of NBR and T-secs.2 For
the 1980-99 period, surprises to non-borrowed reserves come in with the wrong sign,
whereas T-sec surprises have the positive correlation that a liquidity eﬀect implies.
Both correlations have the wrong sign for the 1961-99 period, but that between sur-
prises to growth in the bond supply and real rates is tiny.




t−1,t ) .056 .138
corr(rt,t+1,g
T−secs
t−1,t ) -.008 .142
corr(NBR,T-secs) -.060 -.118
The lessons from the data can be summarized as follows:
1. T-bills vs non-borrowed reserves. Short-term interest rates respond more strongly
to changes in T-bills than they do to changes in the money supply or non-
borrowed reserves,
2. Interest rates and stock returns: T-bill rates are uncorrelated or negatively
c o r r e l a t e dw i t hs t o c kr e t u r n s ,a n ds u r p r i s eb o n dp u r c h a s e sd on o tr a i s es t o c k
prices ￿ all this at monthly frequencies, and
3. Risk and the decline of Treasury ￿nance: The quantities of outstanding T-
securities have steadily declined relative to the unpredictable rollover demands
for them at auction by foreign monetary authorities and ￿nancial institutions.
This raises supply risk to bond traders. Including a broader range of short-term
securities in the Fed￿s portfolio would stabilize the growth rate of T-secs, as the
risk would be spread across a wider range of assets.
Section 2 assesses the eﬀects that bond-supply risk has had over the past 80 years
on the ex-post real returns obtained by purchasing a new three-month T-bill and
holding it until maturity and compares them to the eﬀects of bond-supply risk on
real stock returns. We then document the role of supply risk under an investment
strategy of purchasing a seasoned three-month T-bill with two months until maturity
and selling it one month later. Section 3 documents the recent decline of Treasury
￿nance and shows that, while supply risk has so far been unrelated to this decline,
further declines will raise supply risk unless the Fed broadens its asset base. Section
4 describes the model, and Section 5 concludes the paper. Appendix A provides more
detail on how T-bills are sold and how open market operations work.
2We compute surprises to T-secs and nonborrowed reserves as one-step ahead forecast errors from
a series of rolling bi-variate VARs with four lags and a 30-month estimation window.
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Figure 1: Rolling standard deviations of monthly growth rates of real per capita
supplies of T-secs and the monetary base, 1920-99.
2 Bond-supply risk and interest rates
How much do bond supplies vary from month to month? Figure 1 shows the stan-
dard deviation of the monthly per capita real growth of the monetary base, T-bills
and T-notes, and all marketable T-secs, including bills, notes, bonds, and certi￿-
cates of indebtedness since 1920.3 The Treasury quantities re￿ect securities that are
outstanding and in the hands of the public (that is, excluding the Fed￿s holdings).4
3We compute the standard deviations using a 12-month rolling window and then apply the
Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter to each series before plotting.
4The quantities of outstanding marketable Treasury securities are end-of-month observations
from individual issues of the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1920-31, the Federal
Reserve Board￿s Banking and Monetary Statistics (1976a, pp. 868-73; 1976b, pp. 509-11)f o r1932-
70, and individual issues of the Treasury Department￿s Monthly Statement of the Public Debt of the
United States thereafter. To compute the quantity in the hands of the public, we subtract the Fed￿s
holdings from Banking and Monetary Statistics (1976a, p. 343; 1976b, pp. 485-7) for 1932-70, and
from individual issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin for 1920-31 and 1971-99. The monetary base
is from the FRED database for 1936-99, with M1 from the Friedman and Schwartz (1970, Table 1,
pp. 4-58) ratio, spliced to the M0 aggregate for 1920-35.
4The striking feature of Figure 1 is the high month-to-month variability of total
T-secs in the hands of the public. This variability was particularly high in the early
1940￿s due to large issues of securities of all maturities to ￿nance the Second World
War. We also observe large rolling standard deviations for the T-bills and T-notes
subset in the midst of the Depression and again from 1942-47. Interestingly, variabil-
ity in the supply of T-secs is much larger than that of the monetary base itself, which
suggests that a considerable portion of what we call supply risk may have served to
stabilize money growth.
How strongly do bond-supply surprises aﬀect the real rate of interest? We shall
use the eﬀects of in￿ation surprises as a standard of comparison and compare the two
kinds of risk, ￿rst for the entire 1920-99 period, and then for three subperiods. Here
is how we proceed:




















where πt,t+1 is the rate of in￿a t i o no fg o o d sp r i c e sb e t w e e nd a t e st and t +1 .R e a r -
ranging and taking logs,
ln(1 + rt,t+1)=−lnPt − ln(1 + πt,t+1).
For any small number ε,l n (1 + ε) ≈ ε. Using this, we approximate the above equation
by
rt,t+1 ≈ it,t+1 − πt,t+1,
where it,t+1 ≡ 1/Pt − 1.
Let the superscript e denote an expected value given information from the previous
p e r i o d ,w h i c hw es h a l ld e n o t eIt−1, so that, for instance, re
t,t+1 = E {rt,t+1 | It−1}.5
Let the superscript u denote the surprise component of a random variable so that,
for instance, rt,t+1 = re
t,t+1 + ru








5The information set It−1 consists of the realized in￿ation rate from t − 1 to t (i.e., πt−1,t), the
real T-bill return from t−1 to t (i.e., rt−1,t),the real return on the S&P 500 portfolio from t−1 to
t, and the growth in the bond supply from t−2 to t−1 (i.e., gt−2,t−1). In other words, thinking of
date t as February and date t−1 as January, and so on, when we commit funds to the bond market
before any February auction, we know the return on the S&P 500 and the in￿ation rate for January,
and the growth of the bond-supply in December. We do not include the growth of bond-supply in
January, however, because that would imply a knowledge of Pt and an absence bond-supply risk.
Therefore, It−1 contains insuﬃcient information to forecast Pt perfectly.
5The ￿rst term is the bond-supply risk and the second is in￿ation risk.
Now assume a liquidity eﬀect of bond-supply surprises on the price of bonds as






where, once again, gu
t−1,t is the surprise growth in number of bonds at t given It−1.








The notation may suggest that the surprises in the above three variables are
formed at diﬀerent dates and are based on diﬀerent information sets, but this is in
fact not the case. The dependent variable and the regressors all derive from the
information set It−1 that we described in the previous footnote. To reiterate, at the
start of date t, agents know the realization of πt−1,t. But the presence of bond-supply
risk means that the agents do not know the date-t supply of bonds when they form
their expectations of Pt and, hence, of it,t+1. This means that they cannot yet know
gt−1,t, since its realization comes too late to be included in the date t information set.
Therefore, in spite of the dating diﬀerences in the subscripts, ￿ ru
t,t+1,￿ gu
t−1,t,a n d￿ π
u
t,t+1,
are surprises based on the same information set, It−1.
We shall estimate (3) with the regression
￿ r
u
t,t+1 = a0 + a1￿ g
u





t−1,t and ￿ π
u
t,t+1 are surprises of the three variables. In practice, we obtain
these surprises using de-seasonalized monthly observations as the one-step ahead
forecast errors from a set of vector autoregressions (VARs) with a rolling estimation
window. To be more precise, the variables in the forecasting equations are:
1. g ￿ the growth rate of real per capita T-secs in the hands of the public,
2. r ￿ the ex-post real return on T-bills,6
3. π ￿ the rate of growth of the consumer price index,7 and
4. the ex-post real return on the S&P 500.8
6Nominal secondary market interest rates on three-month T-bills are from the FRED database
for 1934-99 and Banking and Monetary Statistics (1976a) for earlier years.
7The consumer price index, which we also use to de￿ate the T-sec quantities, is that for all urban
consumers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
8Nominal calendar-month returns on the S&P 500 assume the reinvestment of dividends, and are
from worksheets underlying Wilson and Jones (2001).
6Thus, all four variables in the system are dimensionless. We then pool the forecasts
and errors from the VARs over the sample period and use them to estimate Eq. (4).
The monthly data represent the highest frequency that is available continuously
for the past eighty years of Fed history. The T-bill return is the monthly average
of daily rates for the current (i.e., ￿on the run￿) three-month T-bill, from which we
subtract realized in￿ation over the next three months. The returns that we consider
￿rst, and the only ones that can be constructed going back to 1920, correspond to
an investment strategy of buying the current 3-month T-bill and holding it until
maturity. Later we consider one-month holding period returns on seasoned T-bills
since 1961. Appendix B is a detailed description of the methods that we used to
prepare the data for analysis and to compute the surprises.
2.1 Supply risk 1920-1999
Using monthly data from January 1920 through December 1999 and forecasting equa-
tions with a 36-month rolling window and three lags, Figure 2 shows the eﬀects of
one-standard deviation surprises to both the price level and the supply of marketable
T-secs available to the public on the annualized ex-post real return on T-bills.9 Pool-














t,t+1 + et. (5)
The superscript u in Eq. (5) denotes a variable￿s deviation from its one-step ahead
forecast from the rolling VAR.
As limited participation models would suggest, ￿ gu
t−1,t raises ex-post real T-bill
returns because a release of T-bills lowers T-bill prices. This in turn contributes
to better-than-expected returns for those who have committed funds to the T-bill
market. Unanticipated in￿ation enters with, essentially, a unit coeﬃcient, which
suggests that ￿ π
u
t,t+1 is indeed a true surprise.




t,t+1 by the centered values of their rolling 12-month standard deviations, and
compound the result over 12 months to annualize. This measures the eﬀects of the
9As we show in Section 4, the government￿s maturity preferences have shifted considerably over
time, but these shifts in themselves did not introduce risk in the total supply of securities available
to the public. Thus, focusing on supply shocks to a single instrument such as T-bills over the long
term would over-emphasize variations in the maturity structure of government ￿nance that were
not ￿shocks￿ but rather just substitutions of one maturity for another. For this reason, we work
primarily with the total of marketable Treasury securities in the hands of the public rather than a
narrower quantity measure such as T-bills alone.
7Year











Figure 2: Eﬀects, in percentage points, of one standard deviation surprises in in￿ation
and growth in the supply of T-secs on annualized real T-bill returns, 1920-99.
surprises on annualized real T-bill returns.10 The ￿gure indicates that both sources
of risk have always mattered, with in￿ation risk at times quite large, especially at
the height of the Great Depression in 1933 and in the year immediately following the
end of the Second World War. The relative importance of in￿ation risk has declined
dramatically over the past two decades, however, as the price level has stabilized.
2.2 The eﬀect of supply risk in three subperiods
The method used to construct Figure 2 assumes that the seasonal adjustment coef-
￿cients applied to the raw data and the responses of the T-bill rate to unexpected
in￿ation and T-sec growth are stable across the 1920-99 period. One way to exam-
ine the robustness of our results to these assumptions is to repeat the analysis over
subperiods. We do this for 1920-46, 1947-79, and 1980-99, and display the results in
10Figure 2 does not span the full 1920-99 period because observations are lost in accommodating
the lag length of the VAR, in constructing the initial estimation window, and in computing the
initial and ￿nal rolling standard deviations of the forecast errors.
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Figure 3: Eﬀects, in percentage points, of one standard deviation surprises in in￿ation
and growth in the supply of T-secs on annualized real T-bill returns, 1920-46.
Table 3-Interest rate regressions for ￿buy-and-hold￿ strategy
Dependent variable: unanticipated real return on 3-month T-bill, ￿ ru
t,t+1
g = T-Bills
g = Marketable T-Secs & Notes
1920-99 1920-46 1947-79 1980-99 1980-99
constant .0001 .0002 .0000 -.0000 -.0000
(0.60) (1.04) (0.01) (-0.24) (-0.29)
￿ gu
t−1,t .0274 .0140 .0069 .0100 .0104
(7.45) (1.97) (1.42) (2.37) (2.66)
￿ π
u
t,t+1 -1.082 -.9963 -.3837 -.3446 -.3537
(-17.31) (-9.43) (-6.04) (-6.54) (-6.79)
R2/(DW) .361 .255 .092 .206 .216
(1.98) (1.19) (1.70) (1.81)( 1.77)
N 919 290 370 205 205
Note: The table presents coeﬃcient estimates for Eq. 5 over the
subperiods included in Figs. 2-6, with T-statistics in parentheses.
The R2 and Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics, and number of
observations (N) for each regression appear in the ￿nal two rows.
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Figure 4: Eﬀects, in percentage points, of one standard deviation surprises in in￿ation
and growth in the supply of T-secs on annualized real T-bill returns, 1947-79.
Figures 3-5. We split the postwar period into pre-1980 and post-1979 segments be-
cause of the shift in Fed targeting policy that occurred in 1979. To accommodate the
shorter sample periods, we limit the underlying VAR models to two lags and shorten
the length of the estimation periods to 30 months. Table 3 includes regression results
for Eq. (5).
Figure 3 reaﬃrms the importance of in￿ation risk in the pre-1947 period, including
the 1933 and 1946 episodes. The eﬀects of supply risk on T-bill returns rise at these
same times and average 0.36 percent over the 1920-46 period, but are always less
important than the eﬀects of in￿ation risk, which averages 5.31 percent. In Figure
4, the narrower scaling re￿ects the overall decline in in￿ation risk that occurred from
1947-79, during which it averaged only 1.35 percent. Even though supply risk also fell
to 0.12 percent over this same period, the decline is considerably less in percentage
terms than that of in￿ation risk. Figure 5, on the other hand, shows that supply
risk has if anything become more important over the past 20 years, averaging to 0.14
percent, while in￿ation risk continued to decline, averaging 0.99 percent.
By 1980, the Treasury had completed a long-term shift in ￿nancing away from
10Year









Figure 5: Eﬀects, in percentage points, of one standard deviation surprises in the
price level and T-sec supply on annualized real T-bill returns, 1980-99.
T-bonds and into shorter-term T-bills and T-notes (see Figure 14i nS e c t i o n4b e -
low). It is therefore possible that ￿uctuations in the quantity of T-bills and T-notes
are more precise measures of supply risk for the post-1980 period than the total of
outstanding marketable T-secs. To see if this preference shift has in￿uenced our re-
sults, we compute supply shocks to T-bills and T-notes only after 1980, and in Figure
6 once again display their eﬀects on real T-bill returns. The results are similar to
those observed for all T-secs, with average real eﬀects of 0.16 percent and 1.0 percent
respectively. Once again, supply risk grows in relative importance over time.
That bond-supply risk, which arises from committing funds to the T-bill market
before supply is revealed, should even approach in￿ation risk in importance is quite
striking. After all, if in￿ation surprises are measured over the entire term of the T-bill,
they should aﬀect ex-post yields virtually point-for-point.11 To generate bond-supply
risk, however, it is necessary for open market operations or variations in auction
11In this section, however, we measure in￿ation over only the ￿rst month of the T-bill term and
then assess its eﬀect on the three-month real yield. Even here we obtain coeﬃcients on the in￿ation
surprises that are close to unity for the 1920-99 period and the 1920-46 subperiod, though the
coeﬃcients are considerably below unity for 1947-79 and 1980-99.
11Year







T-Bill and T-Note Supply Risk
Inflation Risk
Figure 6: Eﬀects, in percentage points, of one standard deviation surprises in in￿ation
and growth in the supply of T-bills and T-notes on annualized real T-bill returns,
1980-99.
quantities to have large eﬀects on interest rates, and this in turn suggests some degree
of market segmentation. Otherwise, in the absence of segmentation, investors could
oﬀset T-sec supply shocks with transactions in the markets for substitute assets.
2.3 Bond-returns and stock returns
If stocks and bonds were perfect substitutes and if they traded in the same market,
their real rates of return would always be equal. In such a world, an open market
operation of the Fed or, indeed, any other event that changed the return on bonds
would change the return on stocks by the same amount. For example a cut in the
federal funds rate would cause bond prices and stock prices both to rise and the
holding rate of return on each asset to fall. The presence of in￿ation risk on bonds
and dividend risk on stocks would, perhaps, weaken the contemporaneous correlation
between the ex-post real returns on the two assets, but would not eliminate it entirely.
One implication of this logic is that if the Fed￿s actions can aﬀect the stock
market, we should expect to ￿nd a positive correlation between bond returns and
12stock returns. Surprisingly, we ￿nd no evidence of a positive correlation between the
two ex-post returns. We proceed as we did with T-bill returns, but now the dependent




t,t+1 = a0 + a1￿ g
u
t−1,t + a2￿ π
u
t,t+1 + et (6)
Table 4 presents our ￿ndings using surprises from the same VAR models that
we used to examine T-bill returns. Interestingly, T-sec surprises never aﬀect real
stock returns. In￿ation surprises, on the other hand, enter with the expected neg-
ative and signi￿cant coeﬃcients in the 1947-79 and 1980-99 subperiods, but with a
positive and signi￿cant coeﬃcient for 1920-46. The latter result may be driven by
a few extraordinary events, such as the sharp de￿ation and decline of equity values
associated with the Great Depression and the in￿ation and rising market values of
the immediate postwar period. In all, the evidence suggests that the stock market
has been relatively unaﬀected by Fed policy.
In Table 5, we report contemporaneous correlations among the variables in our
VARs (i.e., the variables themselves and not their surprises) and for the monetary
Table 4￿Stock return regressions
Dependent variable: unanticipated real return on a 1-month invest-
ment in the S&P 500 portfolio, ￿ su
t,t+1
g = T-Bills
g = Marketable T-Secs & Notes
1920-99 1920-46 1947-79 1980-99 1980-99
constant -.0014 -.0033 .0014 -.0002 -.0008
(-0.55) (-0.50) (0.57) (-0.06) (-0.19)
￿ gu
t−1,t .1085 -.0851 -.0558 -.2390 -.1476
(1.20) (-0.42) (-0.36) (-0.76) (-0.503)
￿ π
u
t,t+1 0.2446 5.753 -5.571 -6.013 -6.296
(0.16) (1.92) (-2.81)( - 1.53) (-1.61)
R2/(DW) .002 .014 .022 .013. 0 14
(1.76) (1.96) (1.84) (1.78) (1.77)
N 919 290 370 205 205
Note: The table presents coeﬃcient estimates for Eq. (6), with
T-statistics in parentheses. The R2 and Durbin-Watson (DW)
statistics, and number of observations (N) for each regression appear
in the ￿nal two rows.
base over the 1920-99 period and the three subperiods.12 Once again, links be-
tween stock returns and growth in bond supplies are weak and inconsistent across
12Since an adequate breakdown of Treasury securities into its T-bill and T-note components is
not available on a monthly basis prior to 1932, the correlations that include T-bills and T-notes in
the two upper panels of Table 5 begin in 1932 rather than in 1920.
13Table 5￿Correlations of real asset returns and real per capita quantities
S&P T-Bills T-B/N T-Sec MBase
1920-99
Real return on S&P 500 1
Real return on T-bills -.034 1
Growth in real T-bills & notes .046 .0711
Growth in real T-secs .006 .110 .669 1
Growth in real monetary base .067 .235 .040 .142 1
1920-46
Real return on S&P 500 1
Real Return on T-bills -.075 1
Growth in real T-bills & notes -.022 .108 1
Growth in real T-secs .040 .048 .680 1
Growth in real monetary base .064 .161 .067 .145 1
1947-79
Real return on S&P 500 1
Real return on T-bills .028 1
Growth in real T-bills & notes .040 .096 1
Growth in real T-secs .003 .185 .575 1
Growth in real monetary base .011 .470 .017. 112 1
1980-99
Real return on S&P 500 1
Real return on T-bills -.032 1
Growth in real T-bills and notes -.061 .188 1
Growth in real T-secs -.050 .208 .962 1
Growth in real monetary base .102 .064 -.065 -.003
subperiods. For example, correlations between real growth in the T-sec supply and
stock returns never exceed 0.05, and have the expected negative sign only for 1980-99.
T-bill returns vary inversely with stock returns in all but the 1947-79 period, but in
all cases the correlations are small. As it turns out, the most consistent correlations
are positive ones between growth in T-sec quantities on the one hand and real T-bill
returns on the other. This is true for the full 1920-99 sample period and for all of
the subperiods. It is also as we might expect, since more T-secs in the hands of the
public require higher interest rates to induce investors to hold them.
Since a rise in T-bills and T-notes in the hands of the public usually implies
bond sales and, hence, a monetary tightening, it is surprising that growth in the
real monetary base ￿ a monetary loosening ￿ seems to go hand in hand with bond
sales (and the higher interest rates that they imply) in all but the 1980-99 period.
To explore this further, we compute the correlations using growth in real per capita
non-borrowed reserves, which is probably a closer indicator of policy stance than
growth in the monetary base, for 1959-99 ￿ the period over which we have a series for
14non-borrowed reserves. We ￿nd in this case that a monetary loosening, as measured
by growth in non-borrowed reserves, also has an unexpected positive correlation with
T-bill returns and T-sec growth, and that this result obtains for both the 1959-79 and
1980-99 subperiods.13 This may again re￿ect important diﬀerences between indicators
of policy stance that are based on monetary aggregates and our bond supply measures.
2.4 An alternative measure of real T-bill returns
Until now, we have considered the eﬀects of bond-supply risk on T-bill returns under
a buy-and-hold strategy. This, of course, is only one strategy that a T-bill investor
might follow, as it is easy for an investor to liquidate a T-bill, and in particular after
a supply or price shock has been realized. To analyze such a holding strategy, we now
estimate Eq. (5) using surprises to the ex-post real one-month holding period return
on a seasoned T-bill as the dependent variable.
The eﬀects of supply risk should be diﬀerent under this shorter-term strategy.
This is because the investor now faces two sources of supply risk ￿ one that occurs
just before the bond is purchased, and another that occurs over the holding period.
A positive shock after commitment but before purchase will lower the bond price and
raise the real return, yet a similar shock over the holding period will lower the resale
value of the bond. Thus, it is deviations of resale values from investor expectations
that were formed prior to purchase that impart risk to the strategy.
To derive the equivalent of Eq. (4) for multi-period bonds, we again de￿ne the
cost of such a bond at date t as 1
Pt units of real consumption. The bond￿s nominal







where we introduce asterisks to re￿ect the change from the buy-and-hold investment
strategy of Sections 3.1-3.3 to the seasoned one-month holding strategy considered
here. The ex-post real return is again approximately, r∗
t,t+1 = i∗
t,t+1 −π∗









Now we need to be quite precise about the dating of information. Let
t−1z
u ≡ the surprise component of a random variable z given It−1,
13The correlations of nonborrowed reserves for 1959-79 are .110 with the S&P, .216 with T-bill
returns, .071 with T-bill and T-note quantities, and .091 with T-sec quantities. For 1980-99, the
respective correlations are .104, .134, .068, and .087. Correlations of the real monetary base for
1959-79 are .096 with the S&P, .461 with T-bill returns, .010 with T-bill and T-note quantities,
and .094 with T-sec quantities. The correlations of nonborrowed reserves with real T-bill returns
diﬀer from those reported in Table 1 because contemporaneous rather than leading relationships are
considered here. In addition, the return measure in Table 1 re￿ects a one-month yield on a seasoned






















T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 7 )i sb a s e do nt h el o g i cb e h i n d( 2 ) .T h e￿rst term deals with
the denominator of the left-hand side; it is the one-step ahead surprise, and is the
same as in (2). The second term deals with the numerator, Pt+1, and is a two-step-
ahead surprise to growth in the bond supply. We shall compute this term as a VAR
forecast using I∗
t−1. Isolating the return surprises on the left-hand side, we have the



















































The ￿nal term in Eq. (8) is in￿ation risk over the holding period.
Under the buy-and-hold strategy that we considered earlier, we subtracted real-
ized in￿ation over the three-month term of the T-bill and, assuming monthly com-
pounding, and converted to a monthly return. The result there re￿e c t e da na v e r a g e
of in￿ation over the next three months. Here we proceed slightly diﬀerently: For
the one-month holding strategy, we subtract the one-month in￿ation rate that corre-
sponds to the actual holding period.
Our analysis of one-month investments in seasoned three-month T-bills is limited
to 1961 to 1999 ￿ the period for which daily secondary market prices on U.S. Treasury
securities are available from the New York Fed and the Wall Street Journal.14 Using
the composite ￿quote sheets,￿ we collected the annualized yield-to-maturity on the
￿nal trading day of the month for the T-bill with closest to 60 days until maturity,
a n dt h e nr e c o r d e di t sy i e l do nt h e￿nal trading day of the next month. We then


















where R2 is the annualized yield-to-maturity on the reference T-bill with approxi-
mately 60 days until maturity, and R1 is the annualized yield on the same T-bill a
month later. Due to weekends, holidays, and the monthly calendar, we do not al-
ways observe prices 30 days apart, so our computation assumes that R1, whenever
14We obtained the secondary market quotes for 1961-86 from the master micro￿lm reels that are
on deposit at the New York Fed￿s Department of Public Information. Quote sheets for 1987-96 are
available at their website (http:www.ny.frb.org). We collected quotes for 1997-99 from individual
issues of the Wall Street Journal.
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Figure 7: Eﬀects, in percentage points, of one standard deviation surprises in in￿ation
and growth in the supply of T-secs on the annualized real one-month return on T-bills,
1961-79.
observed, also applies on the 30th and ￿nal day of the holding period. This ignores
changes in secondary market yields that might arise for a seasoned T-bill over at
most a two-day period, but does not generate any systematic bias. We convert to
real terms by subtracting CPI in￿ation.
After again obtaining surprises to T-bill returns, in￿a t i o n ,a n dg r o w t ho ft h eT - s e c
supply from a series of 30-month rolling VARs with two lags and the S&P 500 return
as a control, we use the coeﬃcient estimates from Eq. (8) to compute the overall
eﬀects of supply risk over the course of a month (i.e., both pre-purchase and holding






































where the Va r(•) terms are variances and Cov(•) t h ec o v a r i a n c e . T h ee ﬀects of
in￿ation risk are the product of a∗
3 and the standard deviation of the forecast errors
for in￿ation. The series of variance-covariance matrices were obtained from 12-month
rolling samples of the forecast errors. Figure 7 presents our results for the 1961-79
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Figure 8: Eﬀects, in percentage points, of one s.d. surprises in in￿ation and growth
in the supply of T-secs on the annualized real one-month return on T-bills, 1980-99.
period, which have been annualized by compounding over 12 months. We report the
corresponding estimates for Eq. (8) in Table 6.
In Figure 7, an in￿ation surprise of one standard deviation lowers the holding
period yield by 1.77 percent on average. Like the results in Figures 2 and 5 for the
￿buy-and-hold￿ strategy, in￿ation risk rises to nearly 4.5 percent in the mid-1970￿s
after ￿uctuating at about 1-2 percent throughout the 1960￿s. Supply risk, though not
signi￿cant in Eq. (8), averages .10 percent, which is only slightly smaller than that
observed under the buy-and-hold for 1947-79.
F i g u r e8a n dt w oo t h e rc o l u m n so fT a b l e6c o v e rt h e1980-99 period, and oﬀer a
direct comparison with Figures 5 and 6. Whether we use all T-secs in the hands of
the public (Figure 8) or only T-bills and T-notes (Figure 9) in forming ￿ gu∗,t h ee ﬀects
of supply risk on one-month yields are similar to those obtained under the 3-month
buy-and-hold, averaging .16 percent and .21 percent in Figures 8 and 9, respectively.
The coeﬃcients on the pre- and post-purchase surprises to growth in the T-sec supply
variables also have the expected and opposite signs, but are statistically signi￿cant
only when T-bills and T-notes are included in ￿ gu∗
t−1,t.T h i sd i ﬀers from the results
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T-Bill and T-Note Supply Risk
Inflation Risk
Figure 9: Eﬀects, in percentage points, of one s.d. surprises in in￿ation and growth in
the supply of T-bills and T-notes on the annualized real one-month return on T-bills,
1980-99.
Table 6￿Interest rate regressions for 1-month holding strategy
Dependent var: unanticipated real return on T-bill t−1￿ ru∗
t,t+1
g = T-Bills
g = Marketable T-Secs & Notes
1961-99 1980-99 1980-99
constant .0000 .0001 .0001
(0.17) (1.12) (1.03)
t−1￿ gu∗
t−1,t .0046 .0061 .0075
(1.02) (1.28) (1.77)
t−1￿ gu∗




t,t+1 -.9644 -.9370 -.9501
(-27.10) (-20.54) (-21.32)
R2/(DW) .796 .683 .704
(2.09) (1.50) (1.50)
N 196 205 205
Note: The table presents coeﬃcient estimates for Eq. (8), with
T-statistics in parentheses.
19under the buy-and-hold, where our analysis of pre-purchase risk in isolation showed
signi￿cant eﬀects of supply surprises for total T-secs as well. In￿ation risk is larger
on average with the one-month holding strategy than with the buy-and-hold. The
closeness of the coeﬃcients on the in￿ation surprises to unity is also good news for
our speci￿cation, as in￿ation should aﬀect the real return point-for-point when the
time periods for the in￿ation and return observations coincide.
Next, we again place the unanticipated component of the real S&P 500 return




























The results, which we report in Table 7, indicate that surprises to ￿ g do not generate
substantive supply risk for investors who are about to buy the S&P portfolio, but that
positive shocks after purchase raise one-month stock returns for the 1980-99 period.
This runs counter to the standard view that stocks lose when the Fed tightens and
gain when the Fed cuts rates.
Table 7￿Stock return regressions for 1-month holding strategy
Dependent var: unanticipated real return on S&P 500, t−1b su∗
t,t+1
g = T-Bills
g = Marketable T-Secs & Notes
1961-99 1980-99 1980-99
constant -.0070 .0042 .0040
(-1.89) (1.12) (1.07)
t−1￿ gu∗
t−1,t .1020 .3533 .3089
(0.37) (1.17) (1.12)
t−1￿ gu∗




t,t+1 -4.153 .6752 .1401
(-1.913) (0.24) (0.05)
R2/(DW) .023 .019. 0 2 0
(1.93) (1.71)( 1.73)
N 196 205 205
Note: The table presents coeﬃcient estimates for Eq. (9), with
T-statistics in parentheses. The R2 and Durbin-Watson (DW)
statistics, and the number of observations (N) for each regression
appear in the ￿nal two rows.
The lack of signi￿cance on the coeﬃcient for the pre-purchase surprise could sim-
ply suggest that the Fed cannot directly and consistently aﬀect the stock market.
The positive and signi￿cant coeﬃcient on the holding period supply shock, on the
other hand, is consistent with a policy of passive responses by the Fed to changing
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Figure 10: T-secs in the hands of the public and the monetary base, 1960-99.
conditions in other asset markets. For example, when the stock market is surging,
the Fed may try to slow it down a bit by injecting bonds and raising interest rates.
Since any relationship between Fed policy and the stock market is probably loose,
however, the bond sale often seems to have little eﬀect, and the market continues to
push ahead.
3T h e e ﬀects of foreseen policy changes: The sec-
ular decline of Treasury ￿nance
The relative importance of T-bills and other marketable T-secs in the aggregate port-
folio has declined over the postwar period. This should not matter for real interest
rates if it is only surprises to the growth of bond supplies that matter. Indeed, most
rational expectations models with money and no nominal rigidities specify no real
eﬀects for expected changes in the money or bond supplies. One such change is
the gradual decline in outstanding T-secs, since this is probably well understood by
agents in the bond and money markets. But this change may not be neutral, or at
l e a s tm a yb e g i nt om a t t e rs o o ni ft h et r e n dc o n t i n u e s .T h i si sb e c a u s e￿uctuations
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Figure 11: Rolling standard deviations of surprises to monthly growth rates of real
per capita T-sec supplies and the monetary base, 1960-99.
in bond supplies stemming from rollover risk and other sources have become larger
relative to the quantity of outstanding T-secs. Figures 10a n d11 suggest that such
a trend may be emerging. Figure 10 shows that the amount of T-secs in the hands
of the public has fallen since the mid-1990￿s. Figure 11, on the other hand, indicates
that the standard deviation of the growth rate surprises (the cause of supply risk)
has increased a little.15 In this section, we document long-run trends in Treasury
￿nancing over the Fed￿s history and argue that their eﬀects on supply risk up until
now have probably been small.
The size of the bond market can be measured by the share of these securities in the
aggregate portfolio. This share will decline if, because of a policy change, the quantity
of Treasury securities made available to the public begins to shrink. The share will
also decline as more individuals gain access to instruments other than bank deposits
for lodging their surplus balances. Figure 12, which include the ratios of federal debt,
15We compute surprises to T-secs and the monetary base as one-step ahead forecast errors from
a series of rolling bi-variate VARs with four lags and a 30-month estimation window.
In this ￿gure and all others in this section, we apply the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter to our data series
before plotting them.
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Figure 12: Outstanding Federal and business securities as shares of gross domestic
product, 1915-99.
commercial and corporate debt, and corporate equities to gross domestic product,
indeed shows substantial declines in the share of marketable federal debt from its
postwar high in 1945. The growing importance of ￿nancial assets in the U.S. economy
and the rapidly rising share of equity in total ￿nance are also apparent. Figure 13
provides additional detail on the rising share of equity in total business ￿nance, with
both the corporate bond and bank lending components of business debt falling to
their lowest levels in recent years. The market for commercial paper has also grown
rapidly over the past three decades, but it remains a small part of total ￿nance. (See
Appendices C and D for descriptions of how we constructed the series for outstanding
corporate equities and the components of outstanding debt that are presented in these
￿gures.)
Figure 14, which provides a breakdown of marketable Treasury securities by type,
shows that long-term bonds dominated government ￿nance between 1915a n d1960,
but that medium-term T-notes and short term T-bills have risen to pre-eminence more
recently. These shifts suggest that a broad measure of government bond activity, such
as the sum of all marketable Treasury securities in the hands of the public, may be
best for evaluating the eﬀects of supply shocks related to the Fed￿s open market
23Year 

















Figure 13: Corporate ￿nancing in the 20th century.
policies over the long term, but that the quantities of T-bills and T-notes might
be more relevant in recent years. These considerations more precisely explain our
choices of variables for quantifying supply risk earlier in this paper. Interestingly,
and in keeping with most rational expectations models, we found in most cases that
the choice of supply variable did not matter.
Figure 12, when combined with the eﬀects of changes in the supply of T-secs
presented in Figure 2, suggests that the decline in the share of these securities in
the aggregate portfolio has had little eﬀect on the distribution of rt ￿ the real return
on T-bills. This stands in sharp contrast to the implications that such a decline
would have in the limited participation model of Alvarez et al. (2001), in which the
interest-rate eﬀects of monetary injections depend inversely on the fraction of agents
that take part in the bond market.
4M o d e l
In this section, we present a segmented markets model that shows how policy can
aﬀect bond-rates but not stock prices. The model is also consistent with the non-eﬀect
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Figure 14: Marketable Treasury Financing, 1915-99.
of trends in policy that the previous section documents.
Assume a representative agent who assembles his portfolio sequentially.I n i t i a l
asset choices are irreversible, and bonds are added to the portfolio at the end. There
is one good. A stock market opens in the morning where agents can trade a single
risky asset, and a bond market opens in the afternoon where agents can trade one-
period bonds. Each bond promises 1 unit of consumption the following day. The
government ￿nances these payments with lump-sum taxes and with further issues of
bonds. There is no money. The agent can give up goods in exchange for stocks in









Stocks pay dividends y which obey the Markov transition law
Pr{yt+1 ≤ y
0 | yt = y} = F (y
0,y).
Total supply is 1.L e t z be the number of shares an agent carries into the current
period, z0 the number of shares he carries into the next period, and p the price of a
25share. Let m ≥ 0 denote the agent￿s savings after the morning￿s trading in the stock
market. The agent will spend all of these savings on bonds in the afternoon. In the
morning, the agent￿s budget constraint is
c + p(z
0 − z)+m ≤ x + yz − τ. (10)
Let x denote the number of bonds carried into (and cashed in) the current period,
and let x0 denote the number of new bonds issued. Let r denote the one-period rate
of interest. An agent cannot exchange shares for bonds in the afternoon, nor can he
borrow using shares as collateral. All uninvested savings would perish and so the
agent exchanges them all for bonds regardless of the prevailing rate of interest. All








0,y t+1 ≤ y
0 | xt = x and yt = y} = G(x
0,y
0,x,y)
be the Markov transition law describing the bond-policy. Finally, let τ denote the
lump-sum tax levied in the morning needed to balance the budget, and let m be the
goods that the government collects from agents in the afternoon in exchange for the
bonds that it issues. Its receipts are then m + τ, and its outlays are x.T h u s i t s
budget constraint is
τ + m = x. (12)
4.1 Equilibrium
We take the aggregate state to be the pair (x,y), and the personal states to be ￿ x and
z.W e￿rst show that an equilibrium entails aggregate laws of the form
p = P (y),




The agent￿s problem: We confront the agent with all possible pairs of personal and
aggregate states, even those that will not arise in equilibrium, and derive his optimal
behavior when faced with these hypothetical situations. The Bellman equation is
v(x,y, ￿ x,z)=m a x
c,z0,m0
(






26and the decision rules are of the form z0 = Z (x,y, ￿ x,z), and m = M (x,y, ￿ x,z).
EQUILIBRIUM: If the agent starts oﬀ with equilibrium quantities (￿ x,z)=( x,1),
prices must induce him to continue to hold the equilibrium quantities (x0,1) in the
following period, and so on. In other words, P, R, and T must be such that Z and
M are optimal decision rules and such that






T (x,y)+M (x,y,x,1) = x (15)
Condition (13) ensures that an agent who holds the representative portfolio z =1
will continue to hold it, and thereby willingly consume the dividend, y. Condition
(14) re-states the bond market equilibrium condition (11). Finally, (15) ensures that
the government￿s transfer, x, is covered by its lump-sum tax and bond issue.
4.2 Stock-returns, bond-returns, and their covariance
The equilibrium returns on stocks and on bonds are, respectively,
RS ≡
[y0 + P (y0)]
P (y)
and RB ≡ R(x
0,x,y)





0 + P (y












and taking conditional expectations in the two equations, the expected return to
equity in state (x,y) is







E {￿ | y}
, (18)
and the expected return to bonds in state (x,y) is
E {RB | x,y} =
1 − Cov{￿R(x0,x,y) | x,y}
E {￿ | y}
. (19)
The Mehra-Prescott formula for the pricing of the T-bill emerges here under two
special sets of circumstances.
271. No market segmentation. If bonds and stocks traded in the same market, the
gross return on T-bills would be
R(y)=E {￿ | y},
which is Mehra and Prescott￿s formula. T-bill policy would then have no eﬀect
on bond-interest rates at all.
2. Predictable T-bill policy:I f x were a constant (a Friedman type of rule), or
perfectly predictable as in the more general case in Proposition 1, the savings
rate would depend only on y,s a yM (y), and so would the rate of interest
via 1+r ≡ R(y)=x/M (y). A unit of consumption saved would then again
guarantee R(y) units in the next period, and the T−bill would then be a riskless
asset.
In models like Lucas (1978) and Mehra and Prescott (1985), there is no role for
Fed policy to aﬀect the returns on either the risky or the safe security. We now derive
the correlation of stock returns and bond returns and show that it does not depend
on policy. Assume that the T-bill policy is of the form
x
0 = φ(x,y,η), (20)
where η is a random variable drawn independently each period. (If x0 were to also
depend on y0, the Fed would be able to anticipate next period￿s output when setting
this period￿s supply of bonds, and this it probably is not able to do). We can now
precisely state a key consequence of the segmentation of the two markets: Neither
the supply shock in the bond market, η, nor the dividend-shock in the bond market,
can induce a correlation between the two variables.
Proposition 1
Cov(RS,R B | y)=0 .





Now, substituting from (20) into (17) and multiplying by M (x,y,x,1)/U0(y) leads
to the librium T-bill investment decision,
M (x,y,x,1) = βE {￿(y,y
0)φ(x,y,η) | x,y}, (21)
and, hence to the equilibrium return on bonds:
RB =
φ(x,y,η)









βE {￿(y,y0)φ(x,y,η) | x,y}
!
(22)
Now, the only variable that aﬀects both arguments on the right-hand side of (22) is
y and the result follows.
In this model, then, the Fed in￿uences the return on bonds, but it cannot aﬀect
the stock market price. The two returns could conceivably move together as y varies,
but not because of a policy intervention.
4.3 Predictable policy shifts
In models like Alvarez et al (2001) and Grossman and Weiss (1983), the fraction of
agents that take part in the bond market is exogenous, and even foreseen movements
in bond sales can matter. Our model is, instead, like Lucas (1990), so that foreseen
changes do not matter. We can now return to Figures 12a n dt h ee ﬀects of changes
in the supply of T-secs documented in Figure 2. Evidently, the relative decline in
these securities has had little long run eﬀect on the distribution of rt.
The share of bonds in the aggregate portfolio is
SB =
M (x,y,x,1)
M (x,y,x,1) + P (y)
.
Policy can reduce SB by reducing x over time. But if the public expects it to occur,
t h ed e c l i n ei nx will leave the distribution of R unaﬀected. Speci￿cally, (and this will
connect us to the material in section 3), we have
Proposition 2 If x0 = ￿ φ(x,y)η,w h e r eη is i.i.d., then
M (x,y,x,1) = ￿ φ(x,y)E {￿(y,y
0) | y}E (η).
is proportional to ￿ φ(x,y),w h i l e
RB =
η
E {￿(y,y0) | y}E (η)
does not depend on the form of ￿ φ.
Proof. Substituting ￿ φ(x,y)η for φ into (21) and using the independence of η leads
to the ￿rst assertion. The second follows from (11).
The critical assumption here is that the distribution of η is ￿xed. As long as that
distribution is indeed ￿xed, the public saves in proportion to the foreseen component
of the policy ￿ φ(x,y). Thus the relative importance of T-bills can decline and leave
the distribution of the T-bill yield unchanged.
29In the model, one can think of η as re￿ecting unpredictable rollover demands of
foreign ￿nancial institutions and monetary authorities in the auction phase. Given
current policy trends described in section 3, the distribution of η cannot remain ￿xed
for much longer unless there is a change in the assets that the Fed uses to intervene
in the money market. That is, this result presumes that the Fed will be able to meet
its rollover demands with a constant variance of η, and yet this has become harder
and harder to do because the gradual paying down of the federal debt has meant that
the unpredictable component of T-bill growth will have to rise if the Fed is to meet
the rollover demands from foreign sources. One way to avoid this is to expand the
set of asset holdings that the Fed uses for this purpose.
5C o n c l u s i o n
If stocks and bonds trade in the same market, and if policy aﬀects real-rates on
bonds, then policy should also aﬀect stock prices. Yet the bond and stock markets
show a lack of comovement that is hard to explain unless one assumes that the
markets are segmented. We presented a model in which stocks and bonds trade in
separate markets, and in which unforeseen shocks to bond-supplies do aﬀect short-
term interest rates, but do not aﬀect stock prices. Expected policy actions have no
eﬀect in the model; this is consistent with the non-eﬀect of the long-run relative
decline in bond-￿nance on the short-term interest rate.
We also found that bond-supply risk normally contributes between 10 and 40 basis
points to the monthly movement in the real rate of interest on T-bills and that the
eﬀect has shown no tendency to decline over the past half century. Indeed, it will
probably rise, as the gradual paying down of the federal debt has made it harder
to expand T-bill issues to accommodate unexpectedly large rollover demands from
foreign sources.
Appendix A: The nature of Bond-Supply risk in the U.S.
The Bond-supply risk arises when agents commit funds to the bond market before
they know the price at which they will buy the bonds or the price at which they will
be able to sell them afterwards. Such risk arises because asset markets are incomplete
and, in the sense of Grossman and Weiss (1983), segmented. Some agents and some
fraction of their resources are ready to trade in the bond market and this exposes
them to risk that comes from randomness in the supply of bonds. Buyers are in
luck when a bond-supply shock is positive because bond prices are then lower than
expected and the rate of return is higher than expected. These agents get a good
deal, and any real consequences are distributional because the shock has favored some
agents at the expense of others.
30To take part in the bond market, institutions must commit liquid assets to the
new-issue and secondary markets. Primary dealers, who make competitive bids in
the course of their direct interactions with the New York Fed in the conduct of
Treasury auctions, pay for their winning bids when the new bonds are issued on
the Thursday following the Monday auctions. Certain depository institutions and
other broker/dealers may also pay for their winning bids on the date of issue. Other
competitive bidders pay at the time of submission and are either refunded excess
balances or called upon to remit additional funds based upon the ￿nal auction price
and security allocations. A majority of secondary dealers, however, acquire new
issues from primary dealers, and presumably pay for them upon delivery, though the
bonds trade actively prior to their issue in a ￿when-issued￿ market. Noncompetitive
tenders, or oﬀers to purchase bonds at the ￿nal auction price, whatever that may be,
are paid for up front on the auction day.16 Noncompetitive bids at T-bill auctions are
currently limited to $1 million per account, and they have accounted for only 10.4
percent of total auction sales since July 1998.17 Thus, even though many bidders can
delay payment until issue, they must be ready to purchase their entire bid if won,
and, in the event of an unsuccessful bid, must act quickly to reinvest liquid assets
that had been set aside. A closer look at how these markets work shows how the
winning bids can become quite uncertain.
By ￿supply risk,￿ in some cases, we mean ￿residual-supply risk.￿ A large chunk
of the demand for T-bills comes from the decisions of foreign ￿nancial institutions
and international monetary authorities (FIMA) regarding whether to roll over their
substantial and various holdings of bonds, and these rollover decisions aﬀect the
residual supply that will be available to the remaining traders because they count
against the issue quantity stated in the auction announcement. Further, when FIMA
make rollovers, they do so at the single auction price as noncompetitive bidders.18
Many individuals also bid non-competitively, but, as mentioned above, the quantities
of such bids are restricted and thus more predictable. All of this means that supply
risk can arise at the auction stage, even though the Treasury announces the face
value of the T-bills that it intends to issue. Since the public knows only the maturing
quantity and not the rollover plans, randomness in these plans, from the perspective
16Noncompetitive bidders who specify a bank account for direct debit under the Treasury Direct
investment plan also do not pay for their bills until the issue date.
17We compute this ￿gure as the average share of accepted non-competitive bids in the total face
value of T-bills sold at each weekly auction of 13-week and 26-week T-bills from July 30, 1998
through April 5, 2001. Press releases of auction results are available at the Bureau of the Public
Debt￿s web site http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov.
18Before November 1998, marketable Treasury securities were auctioned in a discriminatory fash-
ion, with the highest bidders receiving their requested quantities in full at the tendered price subject
to a maximum of 35 percent of the total quantity auctioned (this ￿35 percent rule￿ is still in ef-
fect). Noncompetitive bidders received their requests in full at prices based on a weighted average
of accepted competitive bids. Both auction systems, discriminatory and single-price, generate some
degree of supply risk.
31of the dealer, makes the ￿nal auction price less predictable.
The Fed itself must also decide whether to roll over portions of its own portfolio
of maturing bonds at the ￿nal noncompetitive price. The securities that the Fed rolls
over do not count against the total oﬀered to the public in that week￿s auction and,
thus, have at best a minimal impact on the ￿nal auction price, but they will aﬀect the
size of subsequent auctions. For example, if the Fed rolls over only half of the bills
that it could have in a given auction, to maintain a constant debt level the Treasury
would need to arrange a larger issue for the next week. It seems, however, that the
Fed￿s rollovers, at least in recent years, have been quite predictable ￿ the Fed rolls
over its entire holdings unless that would exceed its self-imposed limit on individual
securities holdings, in which case it redeems enough to meet that limit.
The Treasury has changed its usual procedures twice recently with regard to for-
eign rollovers, and the nature of these changes suggests that it may be trying to reduce
supply risk. In early 1999, auction announcements still speci￿ed that the Treasury
could, at its discretion, issue additional securities for foreign accounts whenever the
total of new bids from these sources exceeded their total holdings of maturing bills.
Beginning with the T-bill auctions of March 29, 1999, however, the Treasury usually
placed an explicit limit of $3 billion on the amount of foreign rollovers that would be
counted against the public￿s total, agreeing to make additional issues automatically if
rollover bids were to exceed this amount. This practice became more common as 1999
progressed. The change signaled a more accommodative stance by the Treasury that
would have reduced residual supply risk by limiting the degree to which unexpected
noncompetitive rollover decisions could aﬀect the ￿nal auction price. As of February
1, 2001, however, the Treasury has allowed only $1 billion in total foreign noncom-
petitive tenders, and that limit cannot be exceeded.19 Foreign institutions seeking
to purchase large amounts of T-secs at auctions must now bid competitively. Even
though this change might ameliorate disturbances that would impede the systematic
paying down of the federal debt, it is also likely to raise residual supply risk.
Cammack (1991,p . 110) reports that the Fed and FIMA combined to buy 43
percent of all T-bills that were sold at auction between 1973 and 1984. By examining
the press releases of auction results, we have found that this portion has risen to 44.8
percent since mid-1998. The risk associated with rollover decisions exceeds the spread
in the distribution of bids and the time-series variation of the winning bids, because
losing bidders (of which there are more either immediately or in future auctions when
the Fed absorbs its limit) must end up holding cash or a lower-return substitute.
19Foreign bids are now restricted to $200 million or less per account, and are ￿lled from smallest
to largest until the $1 billion total limit is reached. The size of foreign bids will be restricted to $100
million or less as of January 1, 2002.
32Appendix B: Estimating the impact of price and T-sec
supply risk on real T-bill returns
The methodology underlying Figures 2-9 begins with adjusting the raw data to
make the timing of monthly observations consistent across variables. Since the nomi-
nal quantity of T-secs in the hands of the public (Xt)a r ea v a i l a b l ea tt h ee n do fe a c h
month while the consumer price index (CPIt) and population (popt) are computed
as annualized monthly averages, we derive the real quantity of Treasury securities at
the end of month t as:
xt =4￿
Xt
(CPIt+1 + CPIt) ￿ (popt+1 + popt)
,
which amounts to averaging the consumption de￿ator and population across periods
to center them with Xt.
To approximate the ex-post real return on T-bills (rt,t+1) associated with the buy-
and-hold strategy (Sections 3.1-3.3), we start with the annualized yields to maturity
on three month (91 day) T-bills that are computed by the Fed as averages of daily
yields over the course of a calendar month (Rt), and subtract the annualized in￿ation
rate implied by the change in the CPI over the next three months. Since the CPI is















This is the monthly real return that an investor would receive by buying a three-
month T-bill and holding it until maturity, assuming that in￿ation rate is steady
across the three months.
The nominal return on the S&P 500 (St) covers an actual calendar month, and
so we derive an ex-post return by subtracting the growth rate of the consumer price
index (CPIt).








which amounts to computing the growth in the CPI after averaging across periods.
Before using the series derived above (as well as CPI in￿ation itself), we de-
seasonalize by regressing each on monthly dummy variables and an adequately high-
order polynomial in time. We include the time polynomial to reduce the degree to
which the estimates of the monthly eﬀects re￿ect cyclical and trend components.
After subtracting the coeﬃcients on the monthly dummy variables from the raw
series, we add the mean of the de-trended series back in to complete the seasonal
adjustment. See Johnston (1984, pp. 234-9) for a clear exposition of this method
along with its advantages and drawbacks.
33The VAR equations used to compute the surprises to growth in the supply of


























h2,kst−k + t + e2,t
where k is the lag length and t is a linear time trend. The time subscripts refer to the
information sets It−k from which the variables derive To allow the forecasts to re￿ect
recent economic conditions, we allow the VAR samples to roll with time, choosing
estimation windows of 36 months (Figure 2) or 30 months (Figures 3-9). This implies
that each successive one-step ahead forecast and forecast error is computed with a
information set that overlaps the previous one in all but the latest and earliest periods.
Using the coeﬃcients from the time t regression, we compute the forecasts for time
t +1as ￿tted values obtained with the information set from time t.
In estimating 4, we pool the monthly surprises across the sample period to obtain
a single set of regression coeﬃcients.
Appendix C: Estimating the market value of outstanding
corporate equity
To estimate the market value of outstanding corporate equity, we extend the Flow
of Funds series (Table L.4) backward using the available data on capitalization for
the NYSE, the regional exchanges, and over-the-counter (OTC) markets. We work
backward not from 1945 (which is when the Flow of Funds begin) but, rather, in 1949
because the closest overlapping observations of OTC activity are for 1949.
The Flow of Funds reports $117 billion for outstanding corporate equities in 1949,
which we divide into the value of NYSE-listed ￿rms, the value of ￿rms listed exclu-
sively on AMEX and the regional exchanges, and the value of ￿rms traded exclusively
in OTC markets. Friend (1958) estimates the sum of NYSE and regional capital in
1949 at $95 billion. We know from CRSP that NYSE capitalization was $68 billion.
This implies a regional capitalization of $27 billion and OTC capital of $22 billion
in 1949. Assuming that the capitalizations of NYSE and regionally-listed ￿rms are
proportional to their transaction values, which are available from various issues of
the Annual Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, for 1935-49, we mul-
tiply NYSE capital by the ratio of regional to NYSE transactions to approximate
movements in capitalization on the regional exchanges. We then adjust the resulting
regional series to match the $27 billion that we estimate for 1949. To estimate re-
gional capital for 1920-34, we observe that the ratio of regional to NYSE transaction
value was steady at 0.18f o r1935-50, and again use NYSE capital to derive regional
capital from 1920.
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Flow of Funds and Backcast
Figure 15: Estimates of Outstanding Equity, 1900-1999.
The OTC market presents a double-counting problem. Friend estimates that,
in 1949, 25% of quoted OTC issues were also listed on a registered exchange. Our
measure of OTC capital must exclude such ￿rms. To derive estimates for 1920-49,
w eu s eF r i e n d ￿ sc o u n t so ft h en u m b e ro fO T C - q u o t e d￿rms over a 3-month window
surrounding three benchmark dates in 1949, 1939 and 1929. There were 5300 such
OTC ￿rms in 1949, of which 75% were not listed on registered exchanges. The median
market value of these unlisted ￿rms was $2.4 million. Therefore, we approximate
exclusive OTC capital at $9.54 million (.75*5300*$2.4) in 1949. Assuming that the
real median size of unlisted OTC ￿rms did not change over 1920-49, we next use the
GDP de￿ator to convert the median size into nominal terms at the other benchmark
dates. Next, we observe that the $9.47 million for 1949 is too small by a factor of
2.3 given our comparable estimate from the Flow of Funds,a n da d j u s tt h eO T C
benchmark estimates by this factor. Finally, we interpolate between the benchmarks
to obtain an annual OTC series for 1929-49.
To obtain OTC capital for 1920-28, we continue to assume that capital on the
exchanges is proportional to relative transaction values. Since we know NYSE capi-
talization and now have estimates for the regional and OTC markets in 1929, we can
estimate of the share of the OTC in total market value in 1929. Since Friend (1958,
35p. 109) provides us with this share for 1926, and 1920, we can use them to estimate
OTC capital for these years given the values of NYSE capitalization from CRSP and
our earlier estimates of regional capital. We interpolate between the benchmarks
once again to obtain OTC capital for 1920-29.
By adding NYSE, regional and OTC capitalizations, we obtain a series for total
market value for 1920-49 that is consistent with the Flow of Funds in the sense that
the two segments coincide in 1949. Our ￿nal estimates of equity capital outstanding,
d i s p l a y e di nt h e￿gure below, are obtained by splicing our series with the Flow of
Funds in 1945. The ￿gure also includes the series for equity capital that would result
from the use of CRSP (1925-99) and our NYSE listings (1900-1924) data alone. The
i m p o r t a n c eo fe q u i t i e st h a tw e r en o tl i s t e do nt h eN Y S Ef r o mt h ee n do ft h eF i r s t
World War to the start of Nasdaq in 1971, as depicted by the vertical distance between
the red and blue lines in the ￿gure, is considerable. Since we wish to use market value
prior to 1920 in Figures 12-14, for the purpose of computing equity￿s share in total
￿nance, we ratio splice the value of NYSE capital from 1900-1920 (obtained from
individual issues of the The Annalist, The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, The
New York Times, and Bradstreet￿s) to our result for 1920-99.
Appendix D: Estimating the market value of business debt
We de￿ne U.S. business debt as the value of outstanding commercial and industrial
bank loans, corporate bonds, and commercial paper. For 1945-1999, book values for
loans and corporate bonds are from the Flow of Funds (Table L.4 lines 5, and 6
respectively). For 1900-1944, the book value of outstanding corporate bonds is from
W. Braddock Hickman (1952), and that of bank loans is from All Bank Statistics.
Since bank loans are reported in the latter source as June 30 ￿gures, we average
across years for consistency with the calendar-year basis of the Flow of Funds.
For commercial paper, the outstanding amount for 1970-1993 is available from the
FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We carry this series to
the present using the quantity of open market paper from the Flow of Funds (Table
L.4 line 2). We extend the series backward to 1959 using the Federal Reserve Board￿s
Banking and Monetary Statistics (1976b, pp. 717-719). These quantities include pa-
per placed both directly (i.e. ￿nance company) and by dealers. For 1919-1958, we
have a continuous series for dealer-placed paper only, again from Banking and Mone-
tary Statistics (1976b, pp. 714-717; 1976a, pp. 465-467), which we ratio-splice to the
later series. The splice leads to what is likely to be an over-estimate of outstanding
commercial paper by 1918 due to the rapid growth of directly-placed paper between
the mid-1920s and 1941. For example, Greef (1937, p. 118), presents a ￿gure of
$874 million for outstanding commercial paper in 1918, while the spliced series would
imply a total of $4.2. Since we do not have the data on ￿nance paper that would be
required to reconcile these series, we have chosen to simply use Greef￿s ￿gures before
361931, the point at which the outstanding totals from both series diﬀer the least in
percentage terms. Prior to 1918, Greef (1937, pp. 57-59) provides estimates of the
volume of commercial paper trading in 1907 and 1912-1916. Assuming 4-6 month
maturities, we then estimate the amount of commercial paper outstanding at 5/12
of the trading volume, and assume constant growth between the benchmarks of 1907
and 1912. We apply the same growth rate to 1900-1906 to complete the series. From
the above, it should be clear that the commercial paper series is not very reliable prior
to 1931. Since we do not perform any econometric analysis with this series, however,
and it turns out to be a small portion of total debt ￿nance in any case during this
period, we consider the inclusion of the totals in Figures 1 and 3 to be useful.
To build a market value series, we include both commercial paper and bank loans,
due to their short maturities, at their book values. We then convert outstanding
corporate bonds from par values to market values using the average annual yields on
Moody￿s AAA-rated corporate bonds (from Moody￿s Investors Service)f o r1919-98
and Hickman￿s ￿high grade￿ bond yields, which line up precisely with Moody￿s, for













We choose δ = 10% to approximate the growth of new debt plus retirements of old




obtain their market value.
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